We study the effect of imperfect memory on decision making in the context of a stochastic sequential action-reward problem. An agent chooses a sequence of actions which generate discrete rewards at different rates. She is allowed to make new choices at rate β, while past rewards disappear from her memory at rate µ. We focus on a family of decision rules where the agent makes a new choice by randomly selecting an action with a probability approximately proportional to the amount of past rewards associated with each action in her memory.
INTRODUCTION
Memories serve as a crucial link between the past and future in dynamic decision-making problems, allowing subsequent decisions to draw on earlier experiences. However, they are hardly perfect in reality: humans routinely rely on faulty memories when making choices, and a firm's time-varying states, such as an active user base that is prone to unpredictable attrition, could sway its strategic focus. This raises the question: to what extent can we make good * The full version of the paper is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2842284
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). SIGMETRICS '18 Abstracts, June 18-22, 2018, Irvine, CA, USA © 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-5846-0/18/06. https://doi.org/10.1145/3219617.3219653 decisions despite having an imperfect memory In this paper, we investigate this question in the context of a stochastic action-reward model. We focus on understanding the interplay between the rate of memory decay and the rate of decision updates; the former a measure of the quality of memory, and the latter a proxy of the decision maker's temporal adaptivity. Our main results demonstrate that the relative magnitude between the two rates can have profound performance implications. Figure 1 : A snapshot of the system where the choice at time t is action 1, and the agent accrues discrete rewards according to Poisson process of rate λ 1 . Each existing recallable reward departs from the system at rate µ, as depicted by the horizontal arrows.
The Model
We begin by describing the model, which is depicted in Figure 1 . The system consists of an agent operating in continuous time, who makes choices by selecting from a set of K actions, K = {1, . . . , K }. We denote by C(t) ∈ K the action chosen by the agent at time t, and refer to {C(t)} t ∈R + as the choice process. When the C(t) = k for some k ∈ K, the agent accrues discrete rewards according to a Poisson process with rate λ k > 0, where each reward can be treated as a token of unit size. We refer to λ k as the reward rate of action k. We assume that there exists one reward rate that strictly dominates the rest, and, without loss of generality, we rank them in a decreasing order, so that
The agent's fading memory is modeled by the "expiration" of past rewards. Each reward is associated with a lifespan, an exponential random variable with rate µ > 0 drawn independently from all other aspects of the system, and a reward departs permanently after staying in the system for a time duration equal to its lifespan. We refer to µ as the rate of memory decay.
For k ∈ K, we denote by Q k (t) the total units of rewards accrued from choosing action k that have yet to depart by time t, and we refer to {Q(t)} t ∈R + as the recallable reward process. Note that at time t the recallable rewards associated with action k depart at an aggregate rate of µQ k (t), and arrive at rate λ k , if C(t) = k, or 0, otherwise. We assume that the agent's initial recallable rewards at time 0 is a bounded vector in Z K + . The agent has the opportunity to make a new choice at a set of update points scattered across time. The update points are distributed according to an exogenous Poisson process with rate β, which we refer to as the update rate, so that the time between two adjacent update points is an exponentially distributed random variable with mean β −1 , independent from all other aspects of the system.
How does the agent make a new choice when an update point arises? In this work, we will focus on a family of choice heuristics referred to as the reward matching rules, which reinforces actions with more positive past stimuli in proportional manner: at time t the agent makes a new choice by sampling from the distribution
where
Here, α is a positive constant referred to as the exploration parameter, which captures the agent's willingness to experiment with an action even if there is currently little or no recallable reward attached to it. If α is set to 0, then the reward matching rule corresponds to the celebrated Luce's linear probabilistic choice model [4] , also studied in behavioral economics [1, 2] and evolutionary biology [3] . We next examine two illustrative examples, which also serve as motivating applications for the more stylized model we study. Example 1 -Consumer Choice Modeling. We may think of the agent as a consumer, the actions as products or service providers, and the opportunities to choose new actions as the times when the consumer is allowed to re-select her membership or subscription. The rewards act as positive experiences or impressions resulting from using a service, and the strength of each impression in the agent's memory diminishes as time progresses. When an opportunity to renew the subscription arises, the agent chooses a new service offering in a manner that is biased towards the ones associated with more recallable impressions.
Example 2 -Dynamic Product Offering under Customer Attrition. In this example, we slightly refine the model by letting the departure rates of rewards vary across actions. Consider a firm who operates a number of service contracts (actions), e.g., mobile phone plans, and needs to decide which contract to offer new customers (rewards) in a series of promotion periods, where one contract is offered for each period. Customers arrive to the system and subscribe to the service contract of the corresponding promotion period. Those who subscribe to contract type k remain an active customer for an exponentially distributed amount of time with rate µ k , before departing from the system. The departure rate µ k reflects some underlying qualities of the contract k. The reward matching rule corresponds to the service provider's choosing, at the end of each promotion period, a new contract with probabilities roughly proportional to the number of active customers associated with each contract.
Performance Metrics and Scaling Regime
The main goal of this paper is to study the agent's long-run behavior in the model described above, and a key quantity of interest is the steady-state distribution of the choice process, C(·), i.e.,
Unfortunately, the choice process is non-Markovian as its transitions are influenced by the recallable reward process Q(·) in a non-trivial way, and this makes it difficult to obtain explicit expressions for its steady-state distribution. To circumvent this challenge, we will focus on the regime where the average lifespan of a reward, µ −1 , tends to infinity, as follows. Fix the action set, K, and the reward rates, {λ k } k ∈K . We consider a sequence of systems, indexed by m ∈ N, where the average lifespan of a reward in the mth system is equal to m, i.e., µ = 1/m.
We will denote by α m , β m , Q m (·), and C m (·) the corresponding quantities in the mth system. Finally, as the rewards' average lifespan, m, tends to infinity, the total amount of recallable rewards in the system also scales as Θ(m). 1 For this reason, we will scale the exploration parameter α m linearly with respect to m, by setting α m = α 0 m, where α 0 is a fixed parameter.
MAIN RESULTS
We now present our main results, which provide exact limiting expressions for the steady-state distribution of the choice process. 
Furthermore, their expressions depend on the scaling of β m , as follows.
(1) (Memory-abundant regime) Suppose that
(2) (Memory-deficient regime) Suppose that β m ≪ 1/m, as m → ∞. Then,
The next theorem characterizes the steady-state expected value of the recallable reward process, Q m (·). For m ∈ N, define the scaled recallable reward process: Theorem 2.2 (Steady-State Recallabe Rewards). Fix α 0 > 0. For all m ∈ N, the scaled recallable reward process, {Q m (t)} t ∈R + , admits a unique steady-state distribution, and the following limits exist:
Simulation Results. The simulation results in Figure 2 show that our theoretical results also provide fairly accurate predictions, quantitatively and qualitatively, in systems with a moderate, finite lifespan: we fix m, while varying the update rate, β. We observe that concentration on the best action intensifies as β increases.
Implications of the Theorems
Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 show that the agent's performances critically depend on how quickly the update rate β m scales relative to the rate of memory decay 1/m, but are otherwise insensitive to the exact expression of β m . This leads to a natural dichotomy of the system dynamics into what we called the memory-abundant and memory-deficient regimes (see Figure 3 for an illustration), and we discuss below several notable properties of the two regimes.
Near optimality and winner-takes-all. Suppose that the constant α 0 in the exploration parameter is substantially smaller than λ 1 /K. Then, our results show that the best action attracts nearly all of the agent's attention, if β m ≪ 1/m (memory-abundant regime). Specifically, in the limit as m → ∞, the agent chooses action 1 with a probability of (1 − K −1 very small compared to λ 1 /K. Recall from Section 1 that the optimal strategy for the agent, should she know all parameters of the problem, would be to choose action 1 at all times. Therefore, in this regime, the reward matching rule is able to deliver near optimal performance. Moreover, the system exhibits an interesting winner-takes-all phenomenon, whereby the degree to which the agent focuses on the best action is independent of the reward rates of all other actions. Reward-rate-proportional allocation. In contrast to the memoryabundant regime, when the update rate scales substantially slower than the memory decay rate, the choice probabilities become proportional to [λ k ∨α 0 +(K −1)α 0 ], which, when α 0 is small, is essentially equal to the reward rate, λ k . The agent's behavior thus exhibits a certain weak reinforcement, where the better actions do attract more attention but only proportional to their respective reward rates, and the above-mentioned winner-takes-all effect disappears.
Rapid updates lead to complete oblivion. While it may be tempting to conclude that faster update rates always lead to better outcomes for the agent, this turns out to be true only when the exploration parameter is relatively small. In fact, as soon as α 0 grows beyond λ 1 /K, in the memory-abundant regime, the agent becomes completely oblivious and chooses actions uniformly at random (Eq. (6)). In contrast, the agent is always biased towards the best action in the memory-deficient regime, albeit mildly, as long as α 0 < λ 1 . The culprit behind the complete oblivion is a lack of patience: when the update rate is fast and the exploration parameter high, the agent tends to switch her choices rapidly, before she is able to collect enough rewards to "learn" the reward rate of any individual action. Consequently, not a single component of the recallable reward, not even the best action, can distinguish itself by consistently rising above the exploration parameter in the long run, and hence complete oblivion becomes the only possible steady state.
